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Abstract 
The establishment of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms of action for the optimal use of resources 
improves accountability, transparency, fairness and the rights of all stakeholders in the company. Each of the 
internal and external mechanisms processes and company activities are supervised and promote accountability 
and achievement of corporate strategic goals is. One of these mechanisms is the focus and ownership structure. 
The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between state ownership and corporate performance 
assessment criteria according to the rate of return on assets and return on equity in companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange in Tehran. The sample includes 107 companies during the years 1392-1388 is. Also, multiple 
regression was used to test hypotheses of significance was performed using the t test and F. Finally, it was found 
that, between state ownership and Performance measurements based on the rate of return on assets, as well as 
between property management and performance evaluation criteria based on the rate of return on equity and a 
significant negative relationship exists. 
Keywords: state ownership, property management, return on assets, return on equity 
 
1.Introduction 
Today, the company owned with variety of possible ownership become common by various stakeholders, with the 
increase in capital market activity has also more extensive the diversity of ownership.  this case, the contrast 
between maximizing the benefits given to workers and brokers. Solving representing problem partly provide 
reassured shareholders that managers are trying to maximize their wealth (Ghalibaf Asl, 2009). 
To ensure the accountability of corporations play in front of the public and beneficiaries should monitor 
and care enough to be taken. Supervision and care in this area is the existence of appropriate mechanisms.(Ghalibaf 
Asl, 2009). 
In representing relation, aimed at owners of wealth maximization, so in order to achieve this objective 
and representative to oversee the work of his performance are evaluated. Thus, the relationship between ownership 
and performance of firms for better and more accurate assessment of the performance of managers, users need to 
appear (Namazi, 2009). 
Also, many factors affect the performance of companies and a lot of research has been to determine the 
financial and accounting relationship between companies and their performance has been made, but the 
concentration of ownership as one of the mechanisms affects firm performance and still governance necessity. 
Given that state ownership in all companies in our country is still high, the main issue of this study is 
whether there a significant relationship between state ownership and criteria for evaluating the company's 
performance? The aim of this study was to investigate the empirical relationship between the state and various 
performance measures such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) the company is listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. 
 
2.Literature review 
Modern corporations face the issue of separation of ownership and control. It is desirable to monitor management 
to ensure it acts in shareholders’ interests. While the biggest shareholder and block shareholders have the resources 
and incentives to supervise the work of management, a dispersed shareholding structure suffers from the “free-
rider” problem. In general, the corporate governance literature has identified block ownership as an influential 
mechanism that mitigates the agency problem between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Large shareholders provide at least a partial solution to the free-rider problem of 
small investors, but blockholder ownership above a certain level may lead to the entrenchment of owner–managers 
that expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1989; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). 
The belief in public ownership inefficiency is underlined by the property rights perspective in economics 
(Martin and Parker, 1997; Villalonga, 2000) and the residual claimant theory (Rowthorn and Chang, 1993). The 
property rights theory claims that such rights in the private sector are more clearly defined than in the public sector, 
and thus, the incentive for seeking profits by private owners leads to more effective monitoring of management 
performance (Alchian, 1965; McCormick and Meiners, 1988). 
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In the US and UK, although ownership structures are dispersed, minority shareholders’ rights are 
protected by a well-developed legal infrastructure, managerial labor market, and active takeover markets. A review 
of the literature on corporate governance issues in Asia by Claessens and Fan (2002) confirms the limited 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Asia and the agency problems exacerbated by the low corporate 
transparency associated with rent-seeking and relationship-based transactions, extensive group structures, and 
risky financial structures. Chinese companies normally have a concentrated ownership structure, limited disclosure, 
poor investor protection, and reliance on the banking system. Law enforcement is quite weak. The large block 
shareholders for Chinese PLCs include private, state, or institutional shareholders. Because the Chinese 
government privatized small- and medium-sized SOEs and corporatized large SOEs during China’s economic 
reforms, many Chinese public listed companies have high levels of state ownership. As the state is a major block 
shareholder of Chinese PLCs, this study identifies the role played by state ownership in firm 
Performance. It explores whether state ownership hinders or improves firm performance for Chinese 
PLCs in the new millennium. The subject of state ownership has inspired many empirical studies. However, the 
empirical evidence for the relationship between state ownership and firm performance has been mixed. Table 1 
summarizes a few key studies and their findings. Qi et al. (2000) examine a sample of Shanghai Stock Exchange-
listed Chinese firms from 1991 to 1996 and conclude that state equity ownership is negatively related to operating 
performance. 
Further, Sun et al. (2002) examine a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1994 to 1997 and conclude that 
state equity ownership has an inverted U-shaped or concave relationship with market performance. They reason 
that government political support and business connections provided through state ownership are valuable and 
necessary to vitalize performance. However, Ng et al. (2009) and Hess et al. (2010), who examine Chinese listed 
firms from 1996 to 2003 and 2000 to 2004, respectively, both find a convex relationship between state ownership 
and market performance. This is inconsistent with the relationship found by Sun et al. (2002). Therefore, the 
relationship between state ownership and Chinese firm performance is unresolved. The mixed empirical results 
may be attributable to different model specifications, firm performance measurements, and sample selection 
techniques. While Jiang et al. (2008) apply OLS regressions to cross-sectional data from 2004, Hess et al. (2010) 
use two-stage least squares analysis on balanced panel data. Hovey et al. (2003) randomly select 97 Chinese PLCs, 
while Wei et al. (2005) include all non-financial PLCs. Most studies have used financial ratios or market-based 
indicators to measure firm performance. Wei and Varela (2003) also use share returns and Lin et al. (2009) use 
firm efficiency. The implications of state ownership on firm performance may vary, as the performance indicators 
measure different aspects of firm performance. Sun et al. (2002) and Wei (2007) use the market to book ratio 
(MBR) as a market-based indicator. Both studies find a concave relationship between state ownership and firm 
performance. Some researchers have used Tobin’s Q to reveal a convex relationship (e.g., Wei and Varela, 2003; 
Ng et al., 2009; Hess et al., 2010). China’s stock prices have been extremely volatile and contain a large noise 
component (Xu and Wang,  999). 
Measures that incorporate share price information such as share returns, the MBR or Tobin’s Q are 
problematic in China (Jiang et al., 2008). It is an issue of the construct validity of the market-based indicators in 
China. As it is less noisy, the Tobin’s Q measurement is better than the MBR. 
 
3.Hypotheses 
In this study relationship state ownership and firm performance evaluation criteria is evaluated. For this purpose 
variable rate of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) to reflect the company's performance is used. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses can be classified in two groups: 
Group I: measure the performance of companies based on the rate of return on assets (ROA) 
The main hypothesis: 
• There is a significant relationship between percentage of state ownership and return on assets. 
Sub assumptions 
• There is a significant relationship between percentage of stock ownership and return on assets. 
• There is a significant relationship between firm size and rate of return on assets. 
• There is a significant relationship between Return on assets ratio and debt. 
Group II: measure the performance of companies based on the rate of return on equity (ROE) 
  The main hypothesis: 
• The percentage of state ownership and return on equity is a meaningful relationship. 
Sub assumptions 
• There is a significant relationship between percentage of stock ownership and return on equity 
managers. 
• There is a significant relationship between firm size and rate of return on equity. 
• There is a significant relationship between debt ratio and return on equity. 
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4.Variable and model and how to measure them 
In this study the dependent variable rate of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as a company’s 
performance measurement. The independent variables include the percentage of state ownership and the 
percentage of share ownership of managers, company size and leverage as control variables. It should be 
mentioned dependent variables; independent control models are defined here to calculate relations. 
 
5. Dependent variable 
Company performance: 
  In financial literature, different criteria are used to measure company performance that  include standards for 
accounting measure that is calculated based on the Company's financial statements such as return on assets and 
return on equity is. (Mojemder 1999, Aburi 2005, Mahmoudi 2009, Ebadi, 2009). 
In this study, the variable rate of return on assets and return on equity as a measure of company performance 
measures that are used can be calculated as follows: 
• Return on Assets (ROA): the ratio of net income to total assets of the company 
• Return on Equity (ROE): the ratio of net income to total equity of the company 
 
6. Independent variables 
Percent state ownership (SO): is equal to the percentage of shares and government institutions, and government 
agencies. 
 
7. Control variables 
• The percentage of share ownership managers (BS): the percentage ownership of board members receives a fixed 
salary from the company and their family members in the company's stock. Responsibilities of board members are 
responsible for most or Managing Director or managing director is closely related. 
• Firm size (SIZE): Previous research indicates that company size and structure of the decision may affect the 
performance of firms (Blondren 1993, Ramasovy 2003, Frank 2003) Therefore, in this study firms as an in order 
to confirm the results of the control variable leaves no traces on the results. Logarithm of total assets in order to 
control the effects of company size on the dependent variable is not so hypothetical: 
Function, company size is calculated logarithm of the total assets of the company. 
• Ratio of debt (DEBET): the ratio of total debt to total assets 
According to the hypothesis multivariate regression model to test hypotheses used in the study is as follows: 
The first group of hypotheses: 
 
The second group of hypotheses: 
 
 
 
 
8.Population and sample: 
For the present study, all companies operating in the Tehran Stock Exchange, the sample is extracted with the 
following restrictions: 
1. The Company's fiscal year ended March each year. 
2 companies during 2010 to 2014 fiscal year have not changed. 
3. The company ended fiscal year 2010 in Tehran Stock Exchange is accepted. 
4. Stock trading company is constantly on the Tehran Stock Exchange has taken place. And stop trading for over 
a month in the stock mentioned happened. 
5. The financial information required in order to extract the required data is available. 
6. The Company is not in financial intermediation category. 
According to the terms of the agreement, the number of selected sample of the population consisted of 107 selected 
companies. 
 
9.Methods and tools of data analysis: 
In this study, using data collected from a sample which contains a number of companies are in the period 2010-
2014, the research hypotheses will be tested. In this study, using panel data to test hypotheses that utilizes software 
SPSS and will be done. That data using software (Excel) after the reform and classification on the basis of variables 
into software SPSS version 22 and the final analysis will be performed. 
 
 
ROEit=α0+α1 SOit +α2 BSit +α3 DEBETit +α4 Sizeit+ έi,t 
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10.Kolmogorov – Smirnov 
Distribution variables with the Kolmogorov - Smirnov test, the results indicated non-normal distributions are 
variable. These results are shown in Table 4-1. And linear scatter plot of the relationship between independent 
and dependent variables of protection. 
Table 4-1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
probe test variables 
0.00 0.088 ROA 
0.00 0.060 ROE 
Table 4.1 shows that the level of significance K-S test for dependent variables rate of return on assets and 
return on equity is less than 5%. So these data are non-normal distribution. So using the software and statistical 
techniques and the transfer function has been trying to normalize the distribution of variables and since the 
dependent variable is the normal distribution of data analysis and parametric tests are used to test hypotheses. 
 
11.Normalize the data: 
In this study the normalized data using Minitab software Johnson transformation method. The results of 
normalize the data presented in Figure 4-1 and 4-2: 
 
Figure 4-1: normality of the dependent variable rate of return on assets 
 
 
Figure 4-2: normality of the dependent variable rate of return on equity 
Now re-normalize the data using the Kolmogorov- Smirnov review the results of the test which has been 
presented in Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
probe test variables 
0.187 0.518 ROA 
0.224 0.4187 ROE 
As can be seen from the table 4-2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov probability for each dependent variable is greater than 
0.05 then it can be concluded that the dependent variable data is normalized. 
 
12.Reliability Test Variables 
Static tests, including the most important test is reliable for estimating a regression coefficient. To prevent the 
creation of artificial regression, static tests are used. In determining the static panel data, there are different tests. 
In the present study to investigate the static variable test Im, Pesran,Shin was used. This test has fewer restrictions 
from Levin and Lin Harris test. The results of these tests are presented in Table 4-3: 
Table 4-3. IPS test 
ROA  ROE DEBET SIZE SO  BS  
-11.299 -11.033 -10.27 -8.33 -12.395 -9.6561 W-stat 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 p-value 
As can be seen from the table 4-3 probability of all variables is less than 0.5. So we can conclude that all 
variables are static, strong reliability. 
 
13.Heteroscedasticity test: 
Heteroscedasticity means that the regression model estimate values are error terms with unequal variances. In fact, 
we estimate that using ordinary least squares regression is performed. We assume that all variances are equal, then 
the error terms have Estimation model. We then use a series of methods and techniques to examine the assumption 
discussed. White test results are provided below is dependent on two variables: 
As can be seen from the table (4-4) F value and rate of return on the assets of the Company equal to 
295.42 and the p-value equal to zero, which indicates that the null hypothesis that there is a dissonance between 
the variance not accepted 
Table 4-4: white test for ROA  
ROA    
295.42  F 
0.00  p-value  
Also, according to the table (4-5) F statistic value in relation to the rate of return on equity of 90.738 and 
a p-value equal to zero, this indicates that the null hypothesis that there is a dissonance between the variance is not 
accepted. 
Table 4-5: white test for ROE  
ROA   
90.738  F 
0.00  p-value  
 
14. Hypotheses test: 
14.1. The first group of assumptions: that company’s measure performance evaluation based on the rate 
of return on assets (ROA) is. 
The main hypothesis: 
• A significant correlation between the percentage of state ownership and firm performance there. 
Table (4-6): The first group test statistical hypotheses 
P-value T coefficient Value Variable name 
0.000  102.990-  9.643- constant 
0.024  2.260-  0.001-  BS 
0.887 0.142 0.00617 SO 
0.642  0.456  0.023  DEBET 
0.000  107.563  0.696  SIZE 
29.429  F  0.957  R Square  
0.000  P-Value  
0.957  Adjusted R Square  
1.562 Durbin Watson  
As shown in Table (4-6) see that the value and significance level of the F statistic, statistics indicate that 
the null hypothesis that the meaningless of the whole model (all zero coefficients) is not accepted and models 
regression estimates, the total is significant. The coefficient of determination, the criterion for the strength of the 
relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable and describes control. In fact, it dictates 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.5, 2016 
 
113 
that percentage of the value of the coefficient of variability is explained by the independent and control variables. 
In this model, the coefficient of determination is equal to 0.957. I.e. 96% of the variance in the dependent variable 
explained by the independent and control variables. Also, the Durbin-Watson statistic model, which is equal to 
1.562, between 1.5 and 2.5, and there is no indication that the errors of autocorrelation model. The results of the 
coefficients of the variables in the table (4-7) provided. As seen, the percentage of state ownership variable 
coefficients indicate that the negative correlation between the percentage of state ownership and return on assets 
of company there. However, given that the level of significance in the relationship between the percentage of state 
ownership and return on assets of the company (P-value = 0.024 <0.05). Therefore this relationship is significant. 
Therefore, the main hypothesis of the study is accepted. This is expected to increase the percentage of state 
ownership, return on assets as a proxy variable performance, decrease. 
The first sub-hypotheses: 
• There are significant correlation between the percentage of stock ownership and corporate performance 
management. 
As can be seen from the table (4-6), variable coefficients percent equity ownership percentage of share ownership 
managers and executives indicate that there is a positive relationship between the rates of return on assets of the 
company. However, given that the level of significance in the relationship between the percentage of stock 
ownership and return on assets of company directors (P-Value = 0.887> 0.05). Therefore this relationship is not 
significant. Thus, the first sub-hypothesis research will not be accepted. The expected rates of return on assets as 
a percentage of stock ownership Site Proxy not affect the company's performance. 
The second sub-hypotheses: 
There is a significant relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
As well as in the table (4-6) see that the coefficient of variable firm size indicates that there is positive relationship 
between   firm size and rate of return on assets (ROA) as a measure of corporate performance assessment. Also, 
given that the level of significance in the relationship between firm size and firm performance is less than 5%, so 
this relationship is significant. Thus, the second sub-hypothesis is accepted. This is expected to increase the size 
of the company, as variable rate of return on alternative assets increased performance. 
The third sub-hypotheses: 
• There is a significant relationship between debt ratio and firm performance. 
Finally, as shown in Table (4-6) see that the company's debt ratio indicate that the debt ratio and return on assets 
(ROA) as a measure of corporate performance assessment there is a positive relationship. Also, given that the level 
of significance in the relationship between debt ratio and firm performance is more than 5%, so this relationship 
is not significant. Therefore, the hypothesis third sub-study will not be accepted. This is expected to change in debt 
ratio; return on assets does not change. 
14.1.2. Group two of hypotheses: that companies measure the performance of companies based on the rate 
of return on equity (ROE) is. 
The second main hypotheses: 
• There is a significant relationship between the percentage of state ownership and firm performance. 
Table (4-7): Statistical results for second hypotheses 
P-value T coefficient Value Variable names 
0.000  15.771  5.170 constant 
0.778  0.282-  0.0  BS 
0.014 2.465- 0.004- SO 
0.000  6.631  1.127  DEBET 
0.000 17.878-  0.405-  SIZE 
5.170 F  0.406  R Square  
0.0  P-Value  
0.402  Adjusted R Square  
2.235 Durbin Watson  
As shown in Table (4-7) see that the value and significance level of the F statistic, statistics indicate that 
the null hypothesis that the meaningless of the whole model (all zero coefficients) is not accepted and models 
regression estimates, the total is significant. In this model, the coefficient of determination is equal to 0.402. Or 
41 percent of the dependent variable explained by the independent and control variables. Also, given that the level 
of significance in the relationship between debt ratio and firm performance is less than 5%, so this relationship is 
significant. Therefore, the third sub-hypothesis is accepted research. The debt ratio is expected to increase the rate 
of return on equity as a proxy variable to increase performance. 
First sub hypothesis: 
•There is a significant relationship between the percentage of stock ownership and corporate performance 
management. 
As can be seen, according to the table (4-7) coefficient of percentage of share ownership manager’s variable and 
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ROE, indicate that there is a negative relationship between them. Also, given that the level of significance in the 
relationship between the percentage of share ownership and return on equity managers (P-value = 0.014<0.05). 
Therefore this relationship is significant. Thus, the first sub-hypothesis is accepted research. The expected increase 
in share ownership managers, the rate of return on equity as a proxy variable performance decreases. 
The second sub hypothesis: 
• There is a significant relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
Also, as shown in Table (4-7) see indicate that the variable coefficient between firm size and ROE as a proxy 
variable to assess the company's performance, there is a positive relationship. Also, given that the level of 
significance in the relationship between firm size and firm performance is less than 5%, so this relationship is 
significant. Thus, the second sub-hypothesis is accepted. This is expected to increase the size of the company, the 
rate of return on equity as a proxy variable to increase performance. 
The third sub-hypothesis: 
• There is a significant relationship between debt ratio and firm performance. 
Finally, as shown in Table (4-7) see that the company's debt ratio indicate that the debt ratio and return on equity 
as a proxy variable to assess the company's performance in a positive relationship exists. Also, given that the level 
of significance in the relationship between debt ratio and firm performance is less than 5%, so this relationship is 
significant. Therefore, the third sub-hypothesis is accepted. The debt ratio is expected to increase the rate of return 
on equity as a proxy variable to increase performance. 
 
15.Conclusion and suggestions 
Since the separation of ownership from management, monitoring managers have been very difficult. The 
establishments of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms of action for the optimal use of resources promote 
accountability, transparency, fairness and the rights of all stakeholders in the company. Each of the mechanisms 
within and outside the organization, the process of monitoring corporate activities and promote accountability and 
achieve other strategic objectives of the company. One of these mechanisms, focus and structure of ownership. In 
this study, the effect of ownership structure on performance evaluation criteria based on the rate of return on assets 
and return on equity have been studied. Based on these findings, the first group of hypotheses that the company's 
performance was evaluated based on the percentage of government ownership rate of return on assets and a 
significant negative impact on the company's performance based on the rate of return on assets. 
This indicates that increasing the amount of outside ownership (state) ownership of the company's 
performance is reduced and the percentage of internal (management) does not affect the performance of the 
company. According to these findings, it is better not state ownership to investors because it is between state 
ownership and corporate performance and significant negative correlation was observed, state ownership cannot 
be conducive to enhancing the performance of the company. The ownership of a significant relationship 
management cannot be pointed out, that is not to say that In general, property management leads to improved 
corporate performance or not? 
The second group also of hypotheses that the company's performance was evaluated based on the rate of 
return on equity, the percentage of government ownership is not a significant effect on firm performance. And 
percentage of ownership and significant influence of management on the company's performance this indicates is 
that by increasing the amount of internal property management of the company's performance based on the rate of 
return on equity is reduced. . According to these findings also provide a better property investment inside 
(management) not as a negative and significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
But so are investment management companies' ownership structures, poor performance is more. Also, test the 
same hypothesis seems that firm size has a positive impact on firm performance, which indicates that the larger 
companies improve corporate performance. 
 
16. Recommendations for future research 
In order to make greater use of the results and also help clarify the effects of ownership structure on corporate 
performance in the future one can be considered the following topics: 
1. Impact of Institutional Ownership on the performance of the firm partnership with institutional owners of 
commercial and institutional owners who do not have a relationship with such company must be examined 
individually. 
2. The role of property management on the performance also included as a control variable in the model. 
3. Study the influence of industry on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance. 
4. The use of other related variables row definitions and other performance variables, examination of the impact 
of ownership structure on corporate performance. 
5. Check and test the structure-property relationships and the performance of companies on a short term less than 
a year. 
6. Repeat this research with regard to political issues and the impact on firm performance. 
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